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ﬁcantly improved the exposition in the paper. Seminar audiences have also been
most helpful.Résumé
This note analyzes some properties of optional two-part pricing in a two
type economy. First, the optimal contracts along the Paretian frontier are
described. Then, the duality relation between the Rawlsian program and the
discriminating monopoly is demonstrated. Last, this property is used to build
a mutualist mechanism implementing the constrained Pareto optima.
Classiﬁcation J.E.L.: D42, D61, D631 Introduction
Optional two-part pricing, extensively used by many public utilities (elect-
ricity, water, railways ...), gives, as shown by Sharkey and Sibley (1993)[4],
some freedom to redistribute the social surplus.1 These authors show in a
partial equilibrium framework that, when a monopoly proposes a menu of
contracts, each specifying the fee and the charge price, it is possible for a
social planner controlling this monopoly to redistribute towards the weak
demand consumer. Our contribution is not to extend their study to a new
framework or to other pricings. Our ambition is, ﬁrst, to emphasize the re-
distributive mechanism of optional two-part pricing, notably with the help
of some graphical presentations, and, second, to propose a simple incentive
mechanism implementing the more redistributive optima. As we will see, this
mechanism takes advantage of the dual relationship between the program of
the discriminating monopoly and the social planner’s program.
This note is organized as follows. The economy is described in section 2.
The constrained Pareto optima are characterized in section 3 even though an
implementing mechanism is proposed and studied in section 4. Limits and
possible extensions of this work are discussed in the last section.
2 The economy
There are two goods, the produced good and the numéraire one. Their quan-
tities are respectively noted q and w. The economy is composed of two types
of agents, indexed i =1 ,2,d e ﬁned by their quasi-linear utility functions:
ui (qi,w i)=Vi (qi)+wi
The functions Vi verify the following properties:

















1See also Roberts (1979) [3] for the case of non-linear pricing.
1Relations (1) state that the inverse demand is positive and strictly decrea-
sing. Relation (2) implies that type 2’s demand is higher than type 1’s; for
quasi-linear utility functions this relation is also the standard single crossing
assumption.
The cost function C of the monopoly which produces the good q veriﬁes
the following assumption:
Assumption 2 C is a convex function on ]0,+∞[ 2:
C
0 (q) ≥ 0, C
00 (q) ≥ 0 (3)
The monopoly using this technology proposes two contracts (p1,E 1) and
(p2,E 2),w h e r ep1, p2 are the usage charges, E1 and E2 the fees. As asym-
metric information prevents perfect discrimination, the contracts must be
incentive-compatible. Moreover, in order to eliminate trivial cases, we will
suppose that First-best optima are characterized by strictly positive consump-
tions.
3 Constrained Pareto optima
In this section, the constraints regimes of the Paretian program are speciﬁed.
Then, the Pareto frontier is outlined and the main properties of optimal
contracts are discussed. This section doesn’t propose any new results, its aim
is simply to clarify the characterization of the Pareto frontier and above all to
present, with the help of a graphic, a pedagogical analysis of the redistributive
mechanism of the optional two-part pricing.
In our economy, the constrained Pareto program is:
Pp (s2):

      
      
max(pi,Ei)i=1,2 S1(p1) − E1
s.t. :
(SC2):S2(p2) − E2 ≥ s2






i (pi), Si(pi)=Vi(Di(pi)) − piDi(pi), si = Si(pi) − Ei,
D(p1,p 2)=n1D1(p1)+n2D2 (p2) and ni is the number of agents of type i.
To discuss the constraints regimes of Pp (s2), it is useful to consider the
ﬁrst-best optima which verify the incentive constraints. Actually, as for every
ﬁrst-best optimum, prices are equal to the marginal cost, incentive constraints
2Fixed costs are thus allowed.
2require equality of fees. Hence, there is a unique ﬁrst-best optimum which
verify the incentive constraints, the so-called Coase two-part pricing. The
types surplus at the Coase solution are noted sco
1 and sco
2 .3
In the following, only the domain s2 <s co
2 is studied4. In this domain the
binding incentive constraint is (IC2).5 To know if (SC2) binds, it is useful
to introduce the Rawlsian solution deﬁned by the maximization of the type
1 surplus subject to incentive and budget constraints. As these constraints
always bind, the Rawlsian objective function, after some substitutions, can
be rewritten:
WR (p1,p 2): =
1
n1 + n2
(Ss (p1,p 2) − n2 (S2 (p1) − S1 (p1))) (4)
where the social surplus Ss (p1,p 2)=
P
i niVi (Di(pi)) − C (D(p1,p 2)).
As usual in this literature, we assume the concavity of this function, and







i is the surplus of
type i at this Rawlsian optimum6, two cases must be distinguished depending
on whether s2 is above or below sR
2 .F o rsR
2 ≤ s2 <s co
2
7, the constrained
Pareto program is equivalent to maximize WR (p1,p 2) subject to (SC2).T h e
(assumed) strict concavity of WR implies two results. First, (SC2) is binding,
second, the second-best frontier, in the surplus space (s1,s 2), is continuous
and strictly monotonic (see ﬁgure 1).
The remaining question is what are the properties of the optimal contracts
along the second-best frontier.A s ,f o rsR
2 ≤ s2 <s co
2 ,o n l yi n c e n t i v ea n d




   
   
maxp1,p2
1




i=1,2 niVi (Di(pi)) = C (D(p1,p 2))−
n1 (S2(p1) − S1(p1)) + (n1 + n2).s2
3Of course, the Coase solution only exists if the ﬁxed cost is not too big with respect
to the demand.
4The other case is symmetrical. To extend our results to the domain s2 >s co
2 , one
only needs to rewrite program Pp (s2) by permuting indices, i.e. one needs to maximize s2
subject to the participation constraint of type 1.
5The space being limited here and the proof being classical, it is not reproduced in this
note.
6As by assumption sco
1 is strictly positive, sR
1 > 0. Then, from (IC2) and eq. (2),i tc a n
be shown that sR
2 >s R
1 > 0.
7Of course, for s2 <s R
2 ,a ssR
2 is the lower value that the Paretian social planner can








Figure~1: The frontier of the constrained Pareto optima with optional two-
part pricing
For each s2, ﬁrst-order conditions give optimal prices:
p2 = C
0 (D(p1,p 2)) (5)
p1 =( 1 + λ)C









(D2 (p1) − D1 (p1))
where Rm1 (q1)=V 0
1(q1)+q1V 00
1 (q1) is the marginal revenue upon type 1 and
λ the Lagrangian multiplier.8
8Equation (6) can be rewrited as follows:
p1 = C0 (D(p1,p 2)) +
n2 − λn1
1+λ
D1 (p1) − D2 (p1)
n1D0
1 (p1)
We note that for λ = n2/n1, we obtain the Coasian prices: p1 = p2 = C0 (D(p1,p 2)).
Otherwise, one could show that for λ =0 , p2 = pR
2 . So, intuitively, we could interpret λ
as a relative weight of type 2 in a linear social welfare function; but, this interpretation

















Figure~2: Starting from the Coasian equilibrium (A and B), the raise of p1
permits to decrease s2 (with s1 constant) in the space (q,T),w h e r eT is the
total spending.
Equation (5) reﬂects the fact that p2 is not an incentive tool when one
tries to increase the type 1 surplus above its Coasian level9. Secondly, we can
easily prove that p1 >C 0.I n d e e d ,e i t h e rRm1 >C 0,o rRm1 ≤ C0 :i n t h e
ﬁrst case, we have of course p1 >C 0,a n d ,i fRm1 ≤ C0,e q u a t i o n(6) implies








Along the constrained Pareto frontier (for sR
2 < s2 <s co
2 ), ds1/ds2 < 0,o n e
gets from equation (7): dp1/ds2 < 0.H e n c e ,t or a i s es1, the social planner
must decrease s2, i.e. increase p1. The intuition of this result can be grasped
graphically.
In ﬁgure 2, the Coasian equilibrium is depicted by points A and B in the
space (q,T) where T is the total spending of each type. The upward line
passing through these points is the nil proﬁt line; it is also the spending line
9This is a well-known result of adverse selection models with Spence-Mirrlees assump-
tion (relation (2) of assumption 1). In a similar framework with n types of agents, Sharkey
and Sibley (1993) [4] proves the same result.
5of each type when the fee is E and the price equal to the marginal cost c 10.
The curves passing through A and B are the iso-surplus curves corresponding
respectively to types 1 and 2.
At the Coase optimum, and in fact at each constrained Pareto optimum,
the only way to increase s1 is obviously to decrease s2. Nevertheless, for this,
one needs to release the incentive constraint of type 2, i.e. to decrease the
surplus of the dishonest type 2. Starting from the Coasian point A, the only
way to proceed is to raise p1 (with an appropriate adjustment of E1 leaving
s1 constant)11. As the surplus of the dishonest type 2, reached at point F, is
now only s0
2 (<s 2), the social planner can extract at most dπ2 with the new
contract (E0,c). As we can see in ﬁgure 2, the increase of budget surplus dπ2
over type 2 exceeds the budget loss dπ1 over type 1.12 So, starting from the
Coase equilibrium, such an adjustment leaves a positive net budget surplus
which, equally redistributed to check incentive constraints, increases type 1’s
surplus13.
Since it permits more redistributive surplus allocation than the Coase
s o l u t i o n ,o p t i o n a lt w o - p a r tp r i c i n gi sau s e f u lt o o lf o rt h es o c i a lp l a n n e r .B u t ,
if he doesn’t directly control the monopoly, implementation of the constrained
optima is questionable: how can he induce the monopoly to select the right
two-part pricing?
4 Implementation by discriminating monopoly
In this section we build mechanisms which implement the more redistributive
optima. To reach this aim we study a regulated monopoly, the so-called
monopoly àl aEdgeworth.14 This monopoly is supposed to use optional two-
part pricing and is subject to an additional constraint to leave a minimal
surplus to type 1. The implementing mechanisms are then deduced from
the duality relation between the discriminating program of this monopoly
and the Rawlsian program; this duality relation was incidentally noticed by
Roberts (1979) ([3], p. 80-81) in a continuous types economy but for a non
linear pricing.
10For simplicity, we supposed in this graphic that the marginal cost is constant.
11Indeed, it is easy to see that a decrease of p1 (leaving s1 constant) incites type 2 to
lie, increases s2, and breaks the budget constraint.
12In fact, at ﬁrst order, dπ1 is negligeable which is not the case of dπ2.
13Those adjustments can be reproduced for all constrained Pareto optima but the Rawl-
sian one.
14This solution deserves to be called monopoly à la Edgeworth with reference to Edge-
worth’s contributions to the regulated monopoly literature (e.g. Edgeworth (1910) [2]).
6Before introducing the monopoly àl aEdgeworth, let us ﬁrst introduce




    
    
max(pi,Ei)i=1,2
P
i=1,2 ni(piDi(pi)+Ei) − C(D(p1,p 2))
s.t. :
(PC i):Si(pi) − Ei ≥ 0,i=1 ,2
(ICi):Si(pi) − Ei ≥ Si(pj) − Ej,i , j=1 ,2
and begin to show that the Rawlsian prices are also the monopolistic ones.






are the solutions of the mo-
nopoly program.
Proof. Under assumption 1, (IC2) and (PC 1) are the only active constraints
and one gets:
E1 = S1 (p1),E 2 = S1 (p1)+( S2 (p2) − S2 (p1))




ni.Vi (Di (pi)) − C (D(p1,p 2)) − n2(S2 (p1) − S1 (p1))
=( n1 + n2).WR (p1,p 2)
T h ee n do ft h ep r o o fi sn o wo b v i o u s .
Consequently, the monopoly equilibrium and the Rawlsian solution diﬀer
only by E1 and E2. In fact, this result hides a fundamental link between them:
they are the two polar solutions of the monopoly àl aEdgeworth. The latter




      
      
max(pi,Ei)i=1,2
P
i=1,2 ni (piDi(pi)+Ei) − C(D(p1,p 2))
s.t. :
(SC1):S1(p1) − E1 ≥ s1
(PC 2):S2(p2) − E2 ≥ 0
(ICi):Si(pi) − Ei ≥ Si(pj) − Ej,i , j=1 ,2
As one can easily demonstrate using classical arguments, equation 2 of
assumption 1 implies that (SC1) and (IC2) are the only binding constraints.
After manipulations, the program Pem(s1) is reduced to the subsequent free
maximization:
max
p1,p2 (n1 + n2)[WR(p1,p 2) − s1]
7Optimal prices and quantities are independent of s1 level and equal to the
monopoly ones. By raising s1 (from 0 to sR
1 ) , all surplus distributions between
the monopoly equilibrium and the Rawlsian solution can be achieved. Ac-
tually, for s1 = sR
1 , the program of the monopoly à la Edgeworth is the dual
of the Rawlsian program. So, naturally, it gives not only the same prices but
also the same fees. Of course, the monopoly à la Edgeworth is an abstract
mechanism since s1 is exogenous.
A way to make the mechanism more realistic is to consider a mutualist
mechanism,i . e .ap r o ﬁt sharing device. In our framework, one can view a
mutualist monopoly as a ﬁrm which redistributes all its proﬁt to its mem-
bers15 according to a sharing key. If this key is contingent upon the chosen
contracts, membership guarantees a part of the proﬁte v e ni ft h em e m b e r
doesn’t consume. Furthermore, we will suppose that this sharing key is ﬁxed
ex ante and the proﬁts are redistributed ex post. The mutualist monopoly’s
customers are thus considered just as shareholders. Therefore, it is natural
to suppose that the aim of the mutualist monopoly is to maximize proﬁt.











      
      
max(pi,Ei)i=1,2
P
i=1,2 ni (piDi(pi)+Ei) − C(D(p1,p 2))
s.t. :
(PC 1):S1(p1) − E1 + θ1Π ≥ θΠ
(PC 2):S2(p2) − E2 + θ2Π ≥ θΠ
(ICi):Si(pi) − Ei + θiΠ ≥ Si(pj) − Ej + θjΠ,i , j=1 ,2
where θΠ is the guarantee share proﬁta n dθiΠ is the proﬁts h a r eo ft y p ei.
Proposition 2 If the monopoly proﬁt is uniformly distributed, θ1 = θ2 = θ,
the mutualist monopoly equilibrium gives the Rawlsian surplus to each type.
Proof. With the uniform sharing key, the program is reduced to the program
Pm. So the optimal quantities and fees are the Rawlsian ones.
The intuition of the previous proposition can be easily grasped graphi-
cally (see ﬁgure 3). Points A and B correspond to the private monopoly
equilibrium (where s1 =0 )16. Because of the quasi-linearity of preferences, a
uniform monetary transfer (to both types) implies a vertical translation of the
Edgeworthian monopoly equilibrium: when a surplus s1 is granted to type
1, the private equilibrium is translated to the new equilibrium represented
by A0 and B0.
15If the good produced is a public utility, all agents are potential consumers and can be
viewed as members of the mutualist monopoly.




















Figure~3: The equilibrium of the monopoly à la Edgeworth (in the constant
marginal cost case) and its translation.
Furthermore, the previous mechanism suggests its extension to the set of
constrained Pareto optima with sR
2 < s2 ≤ sco
2 .
Proposition 3 For every s2,w i t hsR
2 < s2 ≤ sco
2 ,t h e r ee x i s t sap r i c ec a p
p such that the mutualist discriminating monopoly mechanism implements
quantities and prices of the constrained Pareto optimum corresponding to s2.
Proof. With the price cap p, the monopoly program becomes:
Pmpc (p):

      
      
max(pi,Ei)i=1,2
P
i=1,2 ni (piDi(pi)+Ei) − C(D(p1,p 2))
s.t. :
(PC i):Si(pi) − Ei ≥ 0,i=1 ,2
(ICi):Si(pi) − Ei ≥ Si(pj) − Ej,i , j=1 ,2
(PCC i):pi ≤ p, i,j =1 ,2
Assumption 1 always implies that (IC1) and (IC2) can’t be both binding.
As (PC 2) is released, (IC2) must bind, and (IC1) is then loosened. So, (PC 1)





maxp1,p2 Ss(p1,p 2) − n2 (S2(p1) − S1(p1))
s.t. :
(PCC i):pi ≤ p, i =1 ,2
For right values of p (pco
1 ≤ p ≤ pR
1 ), this program implies, for every value
of p1, p2 = C0. And by strict concavity, p1 = p.T oi m p l e m e n tc o n s t r a i n e d
Pareto optima (in quantities and prices) for sR
2 < s2 ≤ sco
2 ,i ti ss u ﬃcient to
set p = p
p
1 (s2),w h e r ep
p
1 (s2) is the optimal price p1 of program Pp (s2).17
5C o n c l u s i o n
This note explores the redistributive properties of optional two-part pricing
in a two type economy. It shows that a monopolistic structure market aug-
mented by a uniform proﬁts h a r i n ga l l o w so n et oi m p l e m e n tt h em o s tr e -
distributive optimum, the Rawlsian solution. If a price-cap is added, this
mutualist mechanism allows one to achieve less redistributive constrained
optima. However, there are three caveats to bear in mind.
First, in a pure mutualist mechanism, only customers share proﬁt, even
though, in the proposed mechanism, each agent receives proﬁt independently
of his consumption decision. However, as here each agent is a customer, the
diﬀerence is blurred. So, this mechanism can only be applied to a subset of
quasi-universally consumed goods, such as electricity, water, public transport.
Second, the eﬃciency of this mechanism requires of course the social plan-
n e rt oh a v es u c hp r e c i s ei n f o r m a t i o na st op r e v e n tm a n a g e r sa n de m p l o y e e s
from capturing proﬁts. So, the mechanism supposes a strict monitoring of
the managers.
Last, a strong implicit assumption of this paper is the fact that the social
planner has a unique redistribution tool: public pricing. Of course, in a more
general framework he can also use income taxation. So, a natural extension
would be to study the complementarity between discriminating public pricing
and income taxation.18
Références
[1] R. Boadway and M. Marchand, (1995). The use of public expenditures
for redistributive purposes. Oxford Economic Papers, 47: 45—59, 1995.
17To understand that the optimal price p1 of program Pp(s2) is a function of s2,i ti s
useful to notice that the equation (8) implicitly depends of s2 (through λ).
18See for example Boadway and Marchand (1995) [1].
10[2] F.Y. Edgeworth, (1910). Applications of probabilities to economics. In
F.Y. Edgeworth (1925), editor, Papers Relating to Political Economy,
pages 387—428. Burt Franklin, New York, 1970. 2nd edition, initially
published in 1910.
[3] K. Roberts, (1979). Welfare considerations of non-linear pricing. Econo-
mic Journal, 89: 66—83, 1979.
[4] W. Sharkey and D. Sibley, (1993). Optimal non-linear pricing with regu-
latory preference over customer type. Journal of Public Economics,5 0 :
197—229, 1993.
11